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Banned from Lawyering: Gordon Martin, Communist1
W. Wesley Pue
Nathan T. Nemetz Professor of Legal History
University of British Columbia

Hindsight judges harshly.
Such has been the fate of those who blocked Gordon Martin’s admission as a barrister and
solicitor2 sixty years ago. Martin held a recognized law degree, had served the required period of
apprenticeship (“articles”), and had met all other requirements for admission -- save one. He was
blacklisted by the organized legal profession’s governing body (the “Benchers”) and the courts entirely
because of his political beliefs. It was accepted that his “personal morals . . . cannot be questioned, that he
was a hard worker at the University and conscientious in his work.”3 But he was a “Marxist communist.”
Their judgment was severely criticized by some of their contemporaries, and history has
condemned them. 4 One distinguished jurist, Roland Penner, criticized the incident as “a scandalous act of
political discrimination. . . . [E]ven more scandalously, the courts in British Columbia upheld the Law

1

Thanks to Robert Russo for research assistance; the late Alfred Watts, Q.C., for propelling me to think
carefully about this case; Mary Mitchell and the UBC Law Library for help in locating resources; Chris
Moore for sharing some of his research on the history of the British Columbia Court of Appeal with me;
Hamar Foster, John McLaren and Dale Gibson for advice and comments; and Robert Russo and Robert
Diab for comments on a draft of this paper. Jamie Disbrow was gracious in sharing her M.A. thesis on
the Martin case with me: Jamie Disbrow, Exclusion by Due Process – Martin v. Law Society of British
Columbia: A Cold War Eclipse of Civil Liberties. Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1996. I regret it came
to my attention only as final copy-editing was underway.
2
Lawyers in all common-law provinces become barristers and solicitors virtually simultaneously now,
with the result that few are aware that these are distinct professions with different roles and obligations.
Lawyers in 1948 were more alive to this and, though little turned on it in the Martin case, addressed the
requirements for call to the bar and enrolment as a solicitor as distinct matters.
3
Re Legal Professions Act, Re Martin, [1949] 1 D.L.R., 105 at 109 (Reasons of the Benchers of the Law
Society of British Columbia) [henceforth “Benchers’ ruling”]. The Benchers of the day were R. H.
Tupper; Sherwood Lett; C. B. Garland, K. C.; A. D. Crease, K. C.; Hon. J. W. de B. Farris, K. C.; G. Roy Long, K.
C.; T. R. Selkirk; W. H. M. Haldane; Elmore Meredith; A. C. Des Brisay, K. C.; C. M. O’Brian, K. C.; and T. G.
Norris, K. C. The Benchers’ Minutes show unanimity amongst those taking part in the decision (shown in italics)
with Lett and Norris being mandated to prepare a statement of reasons.
4
See Jamie Disbrow, “Exclusion by due process: Martin v. Law Society of British Columbia: a cold war eclipse of
civil liberties” (M.A. Thesis, History, University of Ottawa) 1996
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Society’s decision.”5 Vancouver lawyer Harry Rankin described the processes that left-wing applicants
were put through as a “private inquisition,” a “Star Chamber tribunal,” a “witch hunt,” and a “most
undemocratic procedure . . . simply political intimidation” designed to dissuade law students from “any
real thinking about change.”6 I have piled on too, accusing the Benchers of acting on a “whim” and the
courts of substituting politics for legal reasoning and failing “miserably to live up to their role as
guarantors of liberty.”7
Such assessments bite but gloss far too quickly over the complicating contexts of mid-century
administrative law and of then-prevalent notions of “character” and the legal profession. An indication of
the gap that separates their notions of “character” from ours is found in the words of the oaths required of
new lawyers. Barristers were called upon to swear “so help me God,” their commitment to adhere to a
distinct professional role:
You are called to the degree of barrister to protect and defend the rights and interests of such
persons as may employ you. You shall conduct all causes faithfully and to the best of your ability.
You shall neglect no man’s interest, nor seek to destroy any man’s property. You shall not refuse
causes of complaint reasonably founded, nor shall you promote suits upon frivolous pretences.
You shall not pervert the law to favour or prejudice any man, but in all things shall conduct
yourself truly and with integrity. In fine, the King’s interests and your fellow-subjects you shall
uphold and maintain according to the constitution and the laws of this Province.8

The Barristers’ Oath (which was identical to the Solicitors’ Oath) was in the following form:
I, A.B. do sincerely promise and swear . . . that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His
Majesty King George VI as lawful Sovereign of Great Britain . . . and of this Dominion of
Canada, and that I will defend him to the utmost of my power against all traitorous conspiracies
or attempts whatsoever which shall be made against his person, crown and dignity, and that I will
to my utmost endeavour to disclose and make known to His Majesty, his heirs or successors, all
treasons or traitorous conspiracies and attempts which I shall know to be against him or any of
5

Roland Penner, C. M., A Glowing Dream: A Memoir (Winnipeg: J. Gordon Shillingford Publishing,
2007), p. 121. Penner had an intense personal interest in the matter during the 1950s as he too was a
communist who sought a career in law. Admitted without difficulty in Manitoba, his subsequent career
included service as attorney general for Manitoba and as dean of law at the University of Manitoba.
6
H. Rankin, Rankin’s Law: Recollections of a Radical (Vancouver: November House, 1975), pp. 65, 71,
72.
7
W. Wesley Pue, Law School: The Story of Legal Education in British Columbia (Vancouver: Continuing
Legal Education Society of British Columbia and Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, 1995),
p. xx. A fully documented version of this work can be found as A History of Legal Education in British
Columbia at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=897084.
8
Benchers’ ruling, at 110. The emphasis is as provided in the reasons for the decision.
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them; and all that I do swear . . . without any equivocation, mental evasion, or secret reservation.
So help me God.9

These words, the solicitors’ status as officers of the court, and their understandings of the roles of
the legal profession steered the outcome. By contrast, today’s “Barristers’ and Solicitors’ Oath” in British
Columbia expunges all reference to loyalty to Crown, country, or Constitution along with obligations to
“neglect no man’s interest,” to respect property, and to obstruct treason:
Do you sincerely promise and swear (or affirm) that you will diligently, faithfully and to the best
of your ability execute the offices of Barrister and Solicitor; that you will not promote suits upon
frivolous pretences; that you will not pervert the law to favour or prejudice anyone; but in all
things conduct yourself truly and with integrity; and that you will uphold the rule of law and the
rights and freedoms of all persons according to the laws of Canada and of the Province of British
Columbia?

Contemporary understandings are found in the written reasons of the Benchers, in a ruling of Mr. Justice
Coady, and in the separate reasons of five justices of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The Benchers’ Ruling
Martin’s communism was beyond doubt. He had run for election to the provincial legislature as a Labour
Progressive Party (communist) candidate and was president of the University of British Columbia’s
student Communist Forum. 10 There was “nothing covert . . . about him. . . . [H]e was a doctrinaire
Communist.”11
Upon applying for admission to the legal professions, Martin was called upon to demonstrate that
he was a “fit and proper person.” The Benchers’ power was derived from the following provisions of the
British Columbia Legal Professions Act:
39(3) They may call to the Bar and admit to practise as a barrister in British Columbia: -( a ) Any person, being a British subject of full age and good repute, who . . . [here follow the
educational, age, and service requirements];
9

Benchers’ ruling, at 109–10. The emphasis is as provided in the reasons for the decision.
“‘Red’ Law Student Okayed by Benchers: Secret Inquiry into Political Beliefs Clears Norm
Littlewood,” Vancouver Sun, 31 July 1948 [henceforth “‘Red’ Law Student”].
11
Mr. Justice Lloyd McKenzie, interview by Professor Marilyn MacCrimmon, 24 May 1995 [henceforth
“McKenzie interview”].
10
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( 4 ) They may admit as solicitors of the Supreme Court: -( a ) Any person, being a British subject of full age and good repute, who . . . [here follow the
educational and age requirements].12

Garfield A. King appeared to represent Martin, and a number of witnesses gave evidence as to his
“character.” One of the witnesses, Lloyd McKenzie, recalled that
he asked me, as president of the class, to speak on his behalf as a character witness, which I did,
before the Benchers. . . . [A]nd I remember being cross-examined by Senator Farris. . . . He was
questioning me, “Do you think he can take an oath of allegiance being a Communist and all
that?” . . . I was waiting outside the Benchers’ room. . . . While I was out in the hall I was talking
to John Stanton. . . . John Stanton was a Communist at that time and the News Herald, the
morning paper of the day, had a headline story about this and said that two well-known Communists, Lloyd George McKenzie and John Stanton, were waiting to give evidence. . . .13

Although Martin admitted to being communist, he initially refused to answer questions about his views
on the ground that the Benchers did not “have the authority to inquire into mine, nor anyone else’s politics.”
The Benchers took a simple view of their statutory obligations (a matter within the field that
lawyers know as “administrative law”): the discretion to admit was entirely theirs. Their decision did not
need to be based on evidence in any ordinary sense of the word, and their only duty was to “exercise their
discretion honestly in the public interest and upon considerations of good sense.”14 Within those bounds,
they said, they were immune from oversight. A bolder assertion of discretionary power and a narrower
scope for external constraint can hardly be imagined: they believed themselves to be fully empowered as
gatekeepers to the profession, and their decisions were irreversible as long as they did not act dishonestly
or in deliberate bad faith.
Martin “adduced evidence in the form of statements, letters and statutory declarations” portraying
him as “a man of good repute and . . . a fit person to be called to the Bar and admitted to the practice of a
solicitor in British Columbia.”15 The evidence of those who knew him was, however, brushed aside,

12

Legal Professions Act, R.S.B.C. 1936, c. 149, as cited in Benchers’ ruling, at 106.
McKenzie interview.
14
Benchers’ ruling, at 114.
15
Benchers’ ruling, at 108.
13
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replaced by the opinion of those who did not. The Benchers doubted the “qualifications for the purpose”
of the individuals attesting to his good repute16 and emphasized that any testimony regarding his
reputation for hard work, conscientiousness, or good personal morals was irrelevant to the question as to
whether his communist beliefs in themselves constituted grounds for exclusion.
Martin testified that he could swear the necessary oaths in good faith17 and that “the beliefs of the
Communists in British Columbia do not entail adherence either to the Marxist doctrine of the overthrow
of constituted authority by force or the subversive doctrines and activities of certain Communists in
Canada.”18 That might have disposed of the objection. The benchers, however, disregarded his stated
beliefs in favour of their own conjecture. They thought his testimony “evasive”19 and considered him
tainted by association with convicted subversives: his testimony was deemed unbelievable.20 Martin’s
efforts to explain the benign meaning of key passages in the writings of Marx and Engels, which
seemingly advocate violent revolution and the abolition of private property, were dismissed as attempts
“to show that they had a meaning other than what an ordinary reader would take from them.”21 In a word,
Martin was a liar.
In remarkably circular reasoning, his claim that he could take the necessary oaths in good faith
served to prove his dishonesty:
When Mr. Martin states that he can conscientiously take such an oath, in view of his
subscription to and general acceptance of the Marxist Manifesto, the Benchers find it difficult to
believe in his sincerity or intellectual honesty.
Their opinion is that in spite of his statements to the contrary he would be taking the
oaths unscrupulously. 22

And dishonesty in this regard negated all testimony as to his character:

16

Benchers’ ruling, at 109.
Benchers’ ruling, at 110; also see “‘Red’ Law Student.”
18
Benchers’ ruling, at 109.
19
Benchers’ ruling, at 107.
20
Benchers’ ruling, at 109.
21
Benchers’ ruling, at 110. Anyone exposed to Marxian theory in graduate school -- or anyone exposed to
legal education, for that matter -- might be somewhat more sympathetic to Martin on the matter of words
meaning other than they seem.
22
Benchers’ ruling, at 110.
17
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An applicant who takes such an oath unscrupulously is in their opinion not a person of probity or
of good repute, regardless of the general opinion as to his character held by persons who know
vaguely of his beliefs. Such persons cannot be expected to be aware of the incompatibility of
those beliefs with the requirements of the oaths to be taken by a barrister and solicitor in the
Province of British Columbia.23

The Benchers accepted as common knowledge that communists are liars. Martin was an admitted
communist. Hence, he was a liar and, ipso facto, not of good repute -- matter disposed of. Once having
admitted to being a communist, Martin could not shed the taint. The Benchers found that he had failed to
satisfy them “that he is a person of good repute within the meaning and intent of the Legal Professions
Act.” Hence, he was “not a fit person to be called to the Bar or admitted as a solicitor of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia.”24
A storm ensued. Students at the University of British Columbia mobilized in his support,
including “even members of the Young Liberals who had a sense of fair play.”25 The student newspaper
attacked the law society,26 and 1,500 students converged, passing a resolution asking “the AttorneyGeneral to prevent any action by the society based on political discrimination against a legally-constituted
organization”27 such as the Labour Progressive Party.

Judicial Review in the Supreme Court of British Columbia
Although the Legal Profession Act of the day provided no avenue of appeal, Martin was able to bring the
matter to the Supreme Court of British Columbia (immediately below the British Columbia Court of
Appeal) through a process known as “judicial review.” He hoped to persuade the court that the Benchers

23

Benchers’ ruling, at 110–11.
Bencher’s ruling, at 114.
25
Rankin, supra note 67 at 65.
26
“Ubyssey Hits Law Society,” Colonist, 29 September 1948, p. 1. It is reported that the student
newspaper “strongly attacked action of the British Columbia Law Society in refusing Gordon Martin
admission to the Bar.” “Martin had stated he presumed the refusal was based on his political views.”
27
“Students Ask Law Society to Explain Stand,” Colonist, 17 October 1948. About 1,500 students
attended a meeting to protest the law society’s refusal to admit Martin.
24
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had acted outside the scope of their statutory powers.28 King presented four arguments on Martin’s behalf.
First, he said that the law society could not demand an Oath of Allegiance of applicants. Second, he
asserted that an apprenticing lawyer (the technical terms are “articled clerk” on the solicitors’ side and
“student-at-law” on the barristers’ side) was entitled to be dealt with under the procedures specified for
the law society’s “Discipline Committee” rather than directly by the Benchers. Both arguments failed on
straightforward statutory interpretation.29
Martin’s status as an articled clerk and student-at-law raised a more difficult, though subtle, point.
Martin had enjoyed such status since 1945 on the basis of the law society’s acceptance of the required
certificate of good moral character. This, King argued, established an inchoate right to admission
triggering an obligation for the Benchers to act “judicially” and not with unbounded discretion. Having
previously been deemed of “good character” and having completed three years of formal legal education
and apprenticeship, he could, so the argument went, properly expect to become a lawyer. For the
Benchers to deny him this as a result of changing their minds as to his character was, under the thenprevailing understandings of administrative law and “natural justice” (due process), a very different
matter from declining to grant a privilege: closer conformance to normal judicial standards of evidence
and proof would be required,30 and the outcome likely would have been different. There was no evidence
that Martin was dishonest, treasonous, bent on violent overthrow of His Majesty’s government, or
anything other than a constitutionally minded, politically engaged, aspiring lawyer who happened to hold
strongly left-wing views. Mr. Justice Coady, however, held that the “certificate of good moral character”
required on commencing apprenticeship was distinct from the “further evidence” required to satisfy the
28

The form of proceeding was “by way of mandamus directed to the Law Society of British Columbia to
show cause” why he should not be permitted to become a barrister and solicitor. Re Legal Professions
Act, Re Martin, [1949] 2 D.L.R. 559 at 559, at para. 1, per Coady J. [henceforth “BCSC”].
29
On the first argument, BCSC, para. 7, “s. 2 of the Oaths of Allegiance Act clearly indicates that the
taking of the oath may be required as a statutory condition to the acceptance of the office.” The reasoning
on the second argument was in two parts. First, the Discipline Committee was engaged only in the face of
a complaint, and there was no “complaint” against Martin. Second, status as an apprenticing lawyer did
not make him a “member of the society” under the Legal Profession Act. Consequently, Martin remained
an applicant for admission who bore the burden of persuading the Benchers of his fitness, not a member
being subjected to discipline (at paras. 10–11).
30
BCSC, at para. 16.
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Benchers of the “good repute” needed for admission to the professions. 31 “Good repute” turns out to be
both conceptually distinct from “good moral character” and a higher standard.
Who knew?
Much follows. Any right to become a lawyer, inchoate or otherwise, evaporates in the face of an
explicit obligation imposed by statute on the Benchers to exercise their discretion in satisfying themselves
as to this distinct requirement.
They are not in such inquiry as they may conduct, bound by strict rules of evidence, nor do they
require to have before them strict proof of every matter or thing which they are entitled to
consider. . . . They are not deprived of their discretionary power by the enrolment of the applicant
nor by the acceptance of the evidence of good moral character submitted at that time. . . . The
statute here, rather than imposing a duty on, grants a power to the Law Society, which in turn is
exercised by the Benchers. Notwithstanding the enrolment of a student-at-law or articled clerk,
the discretionary power to call or admit is, it seems to me, in no way thereby curtailed or
abrogated. It still remains in the absolute discretion of the Benchers and so long as that discretion
is exercised honestly, fairly and reasonably, and from no indirect or improper motives and on no
irrelevant or alien grounds, it is not open to review. . . .32

Martin’s final argument also failed. It asserted that the Benchers had taken “irrelevant or alien
grounds” into consideration. In passing the Legal Professions Act, he argued, the legislature could not be
presumed to have intended the Benchers to engage in political screening because penalizing a person for
his or her beliefs, opinions, or ideologies was a violation of the constitutional rights of a citizen. In preCharter days, a provincial legislature would likely have been able to do this had it explicitly stated that
objective.33 But the courts, so the argument went, should not import a legislative desire to violate
fundamental freedoms into their reading of the statute. King argued that “the Benchers . . . have allowed
extraneous and alien matters to affect their decision.”34 These are important terms of art. Any decisionmaking body resting its decision on irrelevant considerations proceeds unlawfully and can be corrected by
the courts. Had this argument succeeded, the Benchers’ decision would have been quashed, and Martin
would have proceeded to his legal career. Coady J., however, would hear none of it: “It is not for the
31

BCSC, at para. 15.
BCSC, at para. 16.
33
Subject to questions relating to the division of powers between the provincial and dominion tiers of
government.
34
BCSC, at para. 17.
32
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Court,” his lordship said, “to substitute its view for that of the Benchers.”35 The Benchers would have the
last word.
In the normal course of events, this should have been the end of the road. Martin had struck out
both at the Law Society and on judicial review, and the relevant statute provided no avenue of appeal. The
notoriety of the case, however, provoked amendments to the Legal Professions Act. Under the new
legislation, “Any person whom the Benchers have refused to call to the Bar or to admit as a solicitor may
appeal from such refusal to the Court of Appeal. . . . [T]he Court of Appeal may, in whole or in part,
either reverse or confirm the decision of the Benchers or refer the matter to the Benchers for further
inquiry.”36

Martin’s Day in the Court of Appeal
Martin’s appeal was heard by five justices, each of whom wrote an opinion. The outcome is clear (all five
ruled against Martin), but multiple judgments serve to obscure the legal principles relied upon. Three
legal issues needed to be decided.
1. What was the proper role of the Court of Appeal in reviewing the Benchers’ decision?
2. Were the Benchers more properly characterized as an “administrative” body or as a “judicial”
body whose decisions affected “rights”?
3. Had the Benchers conducted themselves properly in reaching the conclusion that Martin was
unfit to become a barrister and solicitor?

Background understandings of communism mattered to all this, of course. The Benchers’
decision effectively created a class of individuals ineligible to become barristers or solicitors as they had
come “to the conclusion that the Marxist philosophy of law and government, in its essence, is so inimical
in theory and practice to our constitutional system and free society, that a person professing them is eo

35

BCSC, at para. 18.
Legal Professions Act, s. 41A as enacted by 1949, c. 35, s. 2, as cited in Martin v. Law Society of
British Columbia, [1950] 3 D.L.R. 173 [henceforth “BCCA”], at para. 2, per Sloan, C. J. B. C.
36
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ipso, not a fit and proper person to practise law in this Province, and hence cannot be of ‘good repute’
within the meaning of the Legal Professions Act.”37
An extravagance of anti-communist rhetoric is the most memorable feature of the judgments.
Chief Justice Sloan thought it an “alien philosophy,”38 while O’Halloran J. A. explained at great length
that adherents to that “pernicious creed”39 were determined to “weaken and destroy the foundations of our
free society”40 and help “Soviet Russia . . . to obtain mastery of the world.”41 Marxism, he said, had a
“strange power over its adherents” similar to the “blind passion” that had motivated Hitler’s “Nazi
youth.”42 Communists rejected “our conception of ethics and morality”43 and such a person was “little
else than a fifth columnist (designedly or not) to assist an unfriendly country to destroy the rights and
privileges a free people have established in Canada.”44 Sidney Smith J. A. expressed agreement with the
Benchers on the merits. He accepted that they were entitled to conclude that “it is one of the tenets of the
Communist movement that they be prepared to overthrow existing Governments by force if necessary.”45
Robertson J. A.’s judgment elaborated the evils of communism, barely touching on the legal issues before
the court. Communist parties, Robertson said, were agents of “the Russian dictatorship.”46 As they sought
violent revolution and conspired “to conquer and rule the world by any means,”47 protestations of loyalty
were not credible. 48 Mr. Justice Bird also believed that communists, operating as a “Fifth Column,” were
unworthy of trust.49

37

BCCA, at para. 9.
BCCA, at para. 6.
39
BCCA, at para. 14, quoting Lord Chief Justice Goddard.
40
BCCA, at para. 12.
41
BCCA, at para. 13.
42
BCCA, at para. 17.
43
BCCA, at para. 23.
44
BCCA, at para. 54.
45
BCCA, at para. 77.
46
BCCA, at para. 63, quoting Oneal and Werner, American Communism (1947).
47
BCCA, at para. 61, quoting a pamphlet on “Communism and Education” published in 1948 by the
Committee on Un-American Activities, US House of Representatives.
48
BCCA, at para. 67.
49
BCCA, at paras. 98, 99.
38
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Chief Justice Sloan and Mr. Justice Sidney Smith explicitly addressed the first of the legal
questions. Each concluded that the matter was most properly treated as an appeal from the decision of an
“administrative” body rather than as a retrial (“trial de novo”). This conclusion severely limited the scope
of matters that the Court of Appeal would consider:
The amendment simply states that there shall be an appeal to this Court, and nothing more. Had it
been the intention of the Legislature that we should embark on new proceedings, nothing would
have been easier than to say so. The appeal is from a decision of the Benchers, and in my opinion
the Benchers are an administrative body. That being so, the usual and well-known principles
governing appeals from such bodies apply here; and so we can only interfere with their finding if
their procedure was wrong, or if they acted in bad faith or against all reason or the public interest,
or if they formed their opinion upon grounds never brought to appellant’s notice.50

Sloan C. J. B. C. also viewed the new procedure as “an ordinary type of appeal from an administrative
body,”51 meaning that the only question for the court was “whether the discretion vested in the Benchers
was properly exercised according to law.”52
Three judges addressed the question of whether an applicant who met the statute’s specified
objective standards of education, training, and citizenship had a “right” to be admitted. Hoping to trigger
an obligation to act judicially, Martin’s counsel (John S. Burton) argued that Martin “had established the
right to be called and admitted since he had complied with the academic and service requirements
prescribed by the Legal Professions Act and had introduced evidence of his good character and repute.”53
Sidney Smith J. A. rejected this argument:
Ill repute completely disqualifies; but good repute is only the beginning of the matter. The truth is
that there is nothing in the whole of the Legal Professions Act that entitles any person to be
admitted to the Society (and in this I include call to the Bar). There are various sections stating
that the Benchers may admit an applicant who complies with such and such conditions; but no
section says that they must admit anyone. The whole is left to their discretion. And we must take
the Act and the amendment as we find them. We cannot add to or detract from them. . . .
[C]ompliance imposes no obligations on the Benchers.54

50

BCCA, at para. 70, per Sidney Smith J. A.
BCCA, at para. 3, per Sloan C. J. B. C.
52
BCCA, at para. 4, per Sloan C. J. B. C.
53
BCCA, at para. 93, per Bird J. A.
54
BCCA, at paras. 71, 72, per Sidney Smith J. A.
51
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Mr. Justice Bird rejected this argument on similar grounds, viewing the applicant as carrying the onus of
satisfying the Benchers as to his suitability for membership.55 Mr. Justice O’Halloran also rejected the
view that anyone might acquire a “right” to be admitted to the professions. The Legal Professions Act
would not confer a discretion in the Benchers if this was the legislature’s intent, he thought. In any event,
there was a logical need to protect the public from those who might use their influence as lawyers to
“destroy our Canadian constitutional democracy.”56 The hardship to an applicant turned away after
investing three years in training did not evoke the court’s sympathy. The duty to protect the public interest
was paramount. In any event, their lordships no doubt agreed with the Benchers that “any hardship is of
his own creation.”57
The characterization of the Benchers as “an administrative and not a judicial body” with a “wide
discretion” in determining “the qualifications and disqualifications of those who seek the privilege of
becoming a member of the Legal Profession”58 dictated a light-touch review. Absent enormous
procedural blunder (such as not giving Martin a chance to address the question of his fitness to the
profession) or conduct tantamount to bad faith, the court would not interfere. The Court of Appeal
implicitly endorsed the Benchers’ understanding that in “exercising a discretion which may depend upon
considerations of policy and practical good sense . . . they must, of course, act honestly. That is the total
of their duty.”59
More pointedly, they were not required to base their decision on a rational interpretation of
evidence. They could, they said, form their judgment on the basis of their own hunches about “matters of

55

BCCA, at para. 93, per Bird J. A.
BCCA, at paras.50, 53, per O’Halloran J. A.
57
Benchers’ ruling, at 113. Had the appellate justices been polled on the matter, it seems certain that
O’Halloran and Robertson, JJ. A., would have agreed. Their anti-communist fervour is beyond doubt.
Although the other judgments make more of the limited role of an appellate court and the deference (not
their language) to be accorded to the Benchers, each of the other justices went out of his way to indicate
his agreement with the substantive outcome.
58
BCCA, at para. 4, per Sloan C. J. B. C.
59
Leeds Corporation v. Ryder, [1907] A.C. 420 at 423, per Lord Loreburn L. C., as cited in Benchers’
ruling, at 107.
56
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general information.”60 They had it on good authority that this would not be arbitrary “except in the sense
in which many honest and sensible judgments are so. They express an intuition of experience which
outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions; impressions which may lie
beneath consciousness without losing their worth.”61 Martin’s supporters might be forgiven if they
viewed this as licence for irrational bias.
The lowered threshold allowed the court to endorse the Benchers’ intuition-based decision
making. It also allowed a US Supreme Court decision finding no evidence that “Communists advocated
the overthrow of Governments by force” to be distinguished. A judicial proceeding involving depriving a
person of vested rights, such as that before the US Supreme Court, required a different quality of proof
than an administrative decision denying a “privilege to a Communist.”62 Sidney Smith J. A. was prepared
to assume an absence of evidence sufficient to “establish a conspiracy” against the government in a court
of law. But, he said, “the Benchers do not require such evidence; they are entitled to exercise their
evidence upon probabilities; and there is quite enough evidence on which an administrative body could
reasonably hold that the Communist movement probably advocates the overthrow of government by
force. The Benchers need go no further to justify their acts.”63
The court was unanimous in upholding the Benchers’ decision. In Sidney Smith J. A.’s view,
We have the right to override them if they act dishonestly against all reason or against the public
interest. Appellant’s counsel admitted below that he did not challenge their bona fides. And I find
that I cannot say that their refusal to admit the appellant is either against all reason or against the
public interest. Therefore I see no ground for interfering with their decision. 64

Chief Justice Sloan thought their reasons reflected “the exercise of a proper discretion according to
law,”65 while Bird J. A. agreed “that the findings made by them disclose a lawful and proper exercise of
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the discretion and public responsibility imposed upon them under the Legal Professions Act.”66 Robertson
J. A. endorsed the Benchers’ conclusion and had “little to add to what has been said by them.”67
Mr. Justice O’Halloran’s reasons merit detailed consideration. His extensive comments about
communism (bad) and Anglo-American political culture (good) provide little direct insight into his
thoughts on the legal issues before the court. On those matters, it is reasonable to infer that O’Halloran J.
A. agreed with the comments of his colleagues, at least in broad outline. He emphasized that Martin had
been heard personally and was represented by counsel before the Benchers and that they had issued
“extended written reasons” for their decision.68 The crux of the matter was of far greater importance than
the minutiae of administrative law:
I dismiss the appeal on the broad ground (although narrower grounds may be found) that
a Marxist Communist cannot be a loyal Canadian citizen; at best his loyalty must be divided
between Canada and the Communist leadership outside Canada which is engaged ideologically
through him (whether he knows it or not) and others of like indoctrination in promoting
disruptively in Canada and other countries what Lenin called “the class struggle of the
proletariat” for the world revolution.
I would dismiss the appeal.69

The legally minded reader will be intrigued by the possibilities suggested in the first parentheses and by
the words I’ve rendered in italics, while those with insight into human psychology (Martin’s and
O’Halloran J. A.’s) will be intrigued by the second parentheses. His lordship’s apparent casualness about
law is matched by his fear of an epidemic of virulent communist indoctrination, spreading invisibly and
corrupting beyond even what its victims imagined. Only demon possession bears comparison. Deep
currents lie beneath these obviously troubled waters.

O’Halloran J. A. and Anglo-American “Freedom”
Mr. Justice O’Halloran’s judgment was the longest of the Court of Appeal judgments by far.70 Wideranging and unremitting in its excoriation of “Marxist Communism” (in contradistinction to
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“constitutional or Christian Socialist” politics71), it is clearly and colourfully expressed. The observation
that “For a Communist to talk about personal freedom of action, expression and thought is like the devil
talking about the delights of Heaven”72 is representative.
Intriguingly, much of the judgment is given over to fierce criticism of American thought.
Thinking USA cases unduly soft on communism, O’Halloran J. A. directly repudiated the “neutral and
detached view of Communism” of “the majority of the United States Supreme Court, as it was constituted
between 1937–1947.”73 The judges of that day were, he said, “detached” and “quixotic,” misled by an
anti-authoritarian philosophy that supported “fictions and formulae difficult to reconcile with the realities
of modern life.” Judgments produced by “slim majorities” of a foreign court, produced in “disturbed
periods,” should be cautiously approached.74
Oliver Wendell Holmes, one of the most celebrated of USA jurists, turns out to be the root of
much evil. His lordship labelled Holmes as “something more than a constitutional Judge,” a sort of
judicial ideologue who “[w]ith John Dewey, Veblen, Beard and Robinson (see Toronto Saturday Night
Editorial March 21, 1950) . . . was the proponent of a distinctive American philosophy, which he
introduced assiduously and vigorously. . . .”75 These comments echo at a distance a breakthrough work in
political theory that appeared in 1949. Morton White’s Social Thought in America: The Revolt against
Formalism76 was a major contribution:
White’s demarcation of the major American thinkers of the late nineteenth century, including
John Dewey, Charles Beard, Oliver Wendell Holmes, James Harvey Robinson, and Thorstein
Veblen, as antiformalists marked the first work of intellectual history dedicated to a broad
theorization of this period. He was the first to treat these individual critiques of historical
analysis, philosophical speculation, and economic discourse as part of a shared intellectual
project. What united these thinkers, according to White, was the growing sense that theirs was a
70
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period of transition, that the social revolution prompted by the corporate form had fundamentally
altered the social and cultural framework of modern society. Consequently, all of these thinkers
were preoccupied with delegitimating the standards of the past and projecting an outline for the
future. The “revolt against formalism,” then, entailed a rejection of “intellectual and moral
rigidity” and an attachment to “the moving and the vital in social life.”77

Each of these disparate thinkers rejected “the ‘formalism’ of abstract and deductive approaches to the
study of philosophy, economics, law, politics, and history.”78 Holmes famously observed that “The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”79 It has been said that the larger group “realized that
the life of the mind has not been logic but experience. As a result, they appreciated that thinking
inevitably involves evaluating, willing, and acting to shape a culture’s perception of itself rather than
attempting to frame ideas according to presumably abstract and unchanging logical rules.”80 In short, they
decoupled thought and policy making from claims of authority based on cultural inheritance, tradition, or
God’s will. Theirs was radical stuff, questioning all other faiths save their own profoundly deep faith in
rationality, evidence, and reason.
Freedom of conscience, speech, and political commitment provided an acute focal point for such
ideas. Two phrases from judgments of Mr. Justice Holmes, uttered in cases involving “Russian
anarchists” prosecuted for seditious publications during World War I and a foreigner denied
naturalization on the ground that her pacifism was inconsistent with an Oath of Allegiance to the United
States, caused especial offence. In those cases, Holmes endorsed “the principle of free thought -- not free
thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate” -- and asserted that “the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”81 The
fuller context of these statements is as follows:
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[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other it is the principle of free thought -- not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom
for the thought that we hate. . . . I would suggest that the Quakers have done their share to make
the country what it is. . . . I had not supposed hitherto that we regretted our inability to expel them
because they believe more than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.82

If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart
you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. . . . But when men have
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas -- that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life
is an experiment. . . . While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe
to be fraught with death. . . . Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave
the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command,
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”83

These fuller passages locate the principle of free expression within a historical context as a fundamental
ground rule that early-twentieth-century USA liberals believed to be essential to democratic governance
in a pluralist society. And it offended Mr. Justice O’Halloran immensely.
“Should we not hate what is wrong?”84 he asked. He located truth in a moral certitude derived
from tradition, not in a process of continuous contestation of ideas: “the principles of constitutional
democracy upon which free society is established, cannot be based upon pragmatic values, determinable
by circumstance and consequentially variable. They must be based on certain absolute values, justice,
truth and reason. That is why inalienable rights were written into the United States Constitution. That is
why we have Magna Carta.”85 Holmes and his sort failed to “recognize moral limitations,” producing an
exaggerated tolerance for even the most offensive speech and thought. Holmes had failed to “recognize a
distinction between propaganda as such, and reasoned statements founded upon historical experience.”86
Communists cannot enjoy freedom of speech, his lordship declared, because we cannot “permit them to
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use it to destroy our constitutional liberties, by first poisoning the minds of the young, the impressionable
and the irresponsible. Freedom of expression is not a freedom to destroy freedom.”87
Holmes, we are told, was “so remote from the common currents of life that he did not read the
newspapers.”88 His out-of-date “anti-authoritarian philosophy” had supported “fictions and formulae
difficult to reconcile with the realities of modern life.”89 Confusing true freedom with the “unrestrained or
abstract licence contained in the anti-authoritarian formula of liberty emotionalized by Rousseau,” his
approach “sought to elevate science almost into the position of religion.”90 Having retired from the bench
in 1932 (at ninety-one), Holmes could not have fully understood the course of history and “[t]he plain
menace of the tyrant state and the conditions which beget it.”91 In any event, because materialist
groundings were similar,92 Marxist communism was a “logical product of the philosophy of Holmes,
Dewey and Beard.”93 Unpleasant fellow travellers indeed.

O’Halloran J. A. and the Professionalism of Canadian Barristers or Solicitors
His lordship also elaborated on another aspect of British-Canadian distinctiveness, the role for the legal
profession. “The Law,” Mr. Justice O’Halloran declared, “is a profession; it is not a business or trade.”94
As such, it stands outside market relations:
[T]he law student’s training is not manual training, but is training of the mind, not only in
law, but if he wishes to be something more than a mere legal mechanic, he must study logic,
history, in particular constitutional history, political science and economics, a certain amount of
philosophy and acquire a reasonable familiarity with English literature, and know something at
least of the literature of other countries. The job of the lawyer is basically to advise people upon
all manner of things arising out of the complexities of life and the frailties of human nature. As
such he cannot fail in time to acquire an influence upon others, impossible to reduce to purely
87
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material terms. It is not too much to say that the training and experience a lawyer undergoes fits
him for leadership to a greater or less degree. Obviously such men should not be partial to
political philosophies and movements that conflict with the interests of their own country.
By reason of these things, all countries throughout the ages have given the lawyer a
correspondingly high place in society -- particularly so in the case of the lawyer who pleads in the
higher Courts. The object of law training is to attract young men of high character, and to train
them in a manner that they will be trustworthy, honourable and competent in the performance of
their legal duties, and will use such influence as they may have to maintain and improve but not
to destroy our Canadian constitutional democracy. They are to be the defenders and not the
destroyers of liberty. They are expected to be sufficiently well-informed and experienced to
distinguish between liberty and licence.
. . . If every person had the right to practice law upon passing the University law
examinations, there would be no protection for the public. It is the duty of the Benchers to protect
the public by refusing admission to the practice of law, not only the type of person who will prey
upon the public for his own selfish ends, but also the type of person who professes a political
philosophy alien to our free society, and who in a time of “cold war” is little else than a fifth
columnist (designedly or not) to assist an unfriendly country to destroy the rights and privileges a
free people have established in Canada.95

Three aspects stand out as particularly jarring to twenty-first-century sensibilities. First,
O’Halloran J. A. thought it “obvious” that no lawyer should hold viewpoints “that conflict with the
interests of their own country.” Specific articles of faith were required:
Those who accept common-law theory and practice confess to a belief in inherent rights of the
individual diametrically opposed to the Hegelian and Marxist concepts of the state. . . . One
dividing point appears clearly on the subject of inherent individual rights as adopted by Locke
(who wrote the political philosophy of the Constitutional Revolution of 1688) and later with
some variations, by Jefferson, when contrasted with the denial of these inherent rights by Hegel,
Marx, Lenin and others upon whose political philosophy any type of totalitarian state is based.
Hegel is the source of modern Fascist and Communist perversions.96

Lawyers, in short, were bound tightly to the existing British-Canadian constitutional structure, and
communism was not a legitimate “political opinion” in the proper meaning of the term.97 Holmes’s notion
of the Constitution as “an experiment” would have seemed as abhorrent as Martin’s Marxism.
Second, O’Halloran J. A. thought that the Benchers’ duty to “protect the public” was not limited - as we now generally think -- to ensuring baseline competencies and screening out amoral individuals
who might “prey upon” unsuspecting clients for their “own selfish ends.” High standards of personal
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integrity and ethics were required, but the leadership roles of lawyers demanded more: conformity to the
requirements of “common-law theory and practice.” The office of barrister or solicitor involved a positive
and expansive duty to state and community not confined to narrow conceptions of role. Lawyers were not
to be mere mouthpieces or guns for hire to do their clients’ will. Protecting the public meant more than
protecting clients.
And third, O’Halloran J. A. emphasized the moral role of lawyers in the community. His
observation that their “influence over others” was “impossible to reduce to purely material terms” points
to the importance of moral influence, broadly understood. Lawyers brought moral compass to bear in
matters of business and in “the complexities of life and the frailties of human nature” in all their
dimensions. A full-service paternalism that acknowledges clients as personal, familial, moral, social,
economic, and spiritual beings puts lawyers’ character into play in a way that simply cannot be imagined
if the professional role is narrowed to serving instrumental or economic objectives in isolation.
When professionalism is so conceived, the conclusion that beliefs “inimical to his country” are
“repugnant to the ancient and honourable profession of law”98 is inevitable. And communist exclusion
followed.

Historian as Quizmaster
How, then, are we to judge?
The Martin case tests the limits of liberal tolerance for diversity of political viewpoints. A cliff
edge is approached, and the possibility of extensive, privacy-intruding investigations of the personal
opinions and characters of prospective lawyers looms. Historical “context” cannot excuse the judges and
benchers from blame. They were called upon to exercise judgment, and no outcome was predetermined
by “context.” Their decisions were widely criticized by mainstream Canadians at the time as well as by
subsequent commentators or adherents to far-left-wing politics. Neither their peers elsewhere in Canada
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nor their immediate successors in British Columbia had the stomach for thoroughgoing ideological
screening. No Canadian McCarthyism took seed; no subsequent case approached the abyss.
The university was a place of tolerance, and leftist students were able to pursue three years of
legal studies without obstruction. At the University of British Columbia law faculty, they were able and
willing to return as good as they received in political argument. Although some “professors were openly
hostile” to Harry Rankin’s politics, “many could remain objective.” 99 Well-known socialists such as
Dalhousie’s John Willis and McGill’s Frank Scott ranked among the most capable and highly respected
Canadian law teachers of the day, and it seems likely that most of the law-teaching profession had little
taste for political repression.
Manitoba’s lawyers declined to follow British Columbia’s lead when a well-known young
communist war veteran, Roland Penner (later provincial attorney general and dean of law at the
University of Manitoba law faculty), decided to pursue a legal career.100 British Columbia’s law society
continued to police the bounds of political belief but did so ineffectually. Immediately following Martin’s
exclusion, four law students were selected for a political inquisition, and each gained admission.101
Rankin viewed the exercise as one in simple “political intimidation, the Law Society letting a whole generation of law students know that it was unacceptable to do any real thinking about change.”102 Sherwood
Lett, who chaired the law society’s credentials committee, required him to swear an affidavit in the
following terms:
I, Harry Rankin, do solemnly swear that I am not a communist or a member of any
association holding communist views, that if called to the Bar I can take the Barristers’ Oath
without reservations of any kind and that I have no intention of following any communist association in the future.
That I do not and will not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates
the overthrow of democratic government by force or violence or other constitutional means.103
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Accepting that the Benchers and judges exercised choice in acting as they did, I want to suggest
nonetheless that attention to context makes moral judgment more difficult than might at first seem. By
way of conclusion, I wish to suggest, first, that the courts took the proper approach to reviewing the
Benchers’ decision; second, that, despite their rhetoric, there was less emotional irrationality to their anticommunism than seems; and, third, that, odd though it may appear, the expansive view of lawyers as
especially charged with a mission in service of king and constitution was the proper understanding of
their time.
Each of the appellate judges emphasized their agreement with the Benchers’ view that
communists were eo ipso barred from admission to the legal profession. This view, and their lordships’
many pages of impassioned, almost hysterical prose, distract from the formal reasons for decision (the
ratio decidendi) of the case. The distinction is important. It is possible both that their views on the
essential nature of communism were wrong and that the legal decision to uphold Martin’s exclusion was
correct.
The legal outcome of the case before the courts was simply that the courts should not seek to
second-guess the judgment of the Benchers because the legislature had granted them a power to decide.
The legislative scheme had to be respected. As there was no evidence of mala fides or improper
motivation, and as Martin had been accorded an opportunity to explain himself, there was no reason to
interfere. For a generation of lawyers who have different attitudes toward administrative decision making
and who are conditioned by the Charter to imagine that courts can always “trump” the legislature, this
approach can be hard to appreciate. Current legal fashion does not imagine a bright-line distinction
between “privileges” and “rights” and does not categorize tribunals as “administrative” or “judicial.”
Twenty-first-century legal culture may take a more favourable attitude toward substituting the views of
judges for the decisions of other bodies. Contemporary legal authority, however, supported the approach
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of the courts in Martin.104 The narrow reasons for decision were certainly correct under the prevailing
legal doctrine of the time.105
Seemingly eccentric understandings of the role of lawyers also appear less strange in context. Our
generation is disinclined to view lawyers as anything other than commercial service providers who
complete business transactions, do solicitors’ work, and deal with the courts on behalf of their clients.
Consequently, we view the ends of regulation as nothing more mystical than protecting clients from
incompetent or unscrupulous individuals. Lawyers’ ethical codes, like those of pharmacists and used car
salespersons, 106 regulate a market for services. Massive transformations during the sixty years separating
us from the Martin case have profoundly changed the character of the legal professions.107 Viewed
through our demystified, democratized lenses, earlier understandings of lawyers’ roles appear puffed up,
inflated, arrogant, implausible, and ridiculous. It matters little to us if a lawyer cannot honestly swear
fidelity to the queen -- or that he or she might be disinclined to subvert “treasonous conspiracies.”108
However, the view that lawyers, through their mundane work, play a key role in social cohesion and
constitutional governance, that their influence and importance cannot be reduced to “purely material
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terms,” has an ancient lineage.109 Indeed, the modern structures of Canadian legal professionalism,
including self-regulation of the profession, codes of ethics, and patterns of legal education, were all
derived from just such a professional ideology. 110 The views of Martin’s antagonists were consistent in
this regard with the highest aspirations for the legal professions as they were then understood. If those
individuals are to be treated as objects of ridicule on this count, it can only be because we judge their time
ridiculous.
What, then, are we to make of the legal establishment’s vehement anti-communism? Both the
vehemence and the “anti” are beyond doubt. Their passion seems irrational. Gordon Martin would engage
in treason; it did not matter that his behaviour was exemplary or that he affirmed his good faith intentions
to swear allegiance to His Majesty. Gordon Martin would seek to subvert “property”; it was irrelevant
that he testified otherwise. Gordon Martin would act as a fifth columnist in the Russian cause; neither his
denials nor the absolute absence of evidence mattered. The court offered its own interpretation of Marxist
doctrine as authoritative, not Martin’s. The fact that his explanation differed from the court’s could only
be because Martin was lying or dangerously deluded. The notion that, as a matter of definition, a
communist could not be a “good Canadian” verges on tautology. To elevate this to a common-law rule
seems ridiculous. All seven reasons for decision in the Martin cases are clear that “evidence” in any legal
sense was neither required nor desired. Considering the case from the point of view of communists who
aspire to become lawyers, the rationale and outcome are outrageous. The thought that a war veteran, the
son of a prominent communist member of the Winnipeg city council, might be denied admission to the
legal profession despite his personal and familial records of service to community and country seems
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repulsive.111 The full horrors of Stalin and Mao were not fully appreciated, and many idealists had reason
to imagine that Marxism might be liberating.
It does not, however, take enormous leaps of imagination to see things from the opposite
viewpoint.112 However unjust the outcome may have been, Gordon Martin was emphatically not the
victim of a witch hunt, picked out for discriminatory treatment as a result of a search for “reds under the
bed,” on account of rumour and innuendo, loose associations, or involvement in unions. The Benchers
had an authentic “red” before them. Moreover, communism then seemed frightening, just as newer
terrorist ideologies have seemed frightening in more recent times. The war against the Nazis was only
recently finished, Nuremberg’s trials had revealed the dangers of extremist political ideology, and the
Soviet Union had mounted aggressive offensives against its former allies. The possibility of the Cold War
escalating to the battlefield would have seemed all too likely to a generation conditioned by the
experience of two world wars. Communist declarations of bona fides weighed lightly against the
experience of the
developments which have occurred since the cessation of hostilities in 1945. The revelations
made in the Report of the Royal Commission on Communist Espionage in 1946 which discloses
the debauching by Communist influences of Canadian public servants occupying positions of
public trust, despite oaths of allegiance and office which they had taken, I am satisfied have
created in the public mind an utter distrust of that philosophy as well as of its adherents. That
distrust has been accentuated by the disclosure of similar activities in Great Britain, i.e., the Fuchs
case and also the Alger Hiss and other like proceedings in the United States.
Communism and all that pertains to that philosophy I think is now recognized as having a
connotation equivalent to Fifth Column. It is common knowledge that Governments on this
continent, public and private organizations, more particularly among Trades and Labour Unions,
alive to the danger of Communist infiltration and influence are now alert to the menace, and are
actively moving towards its elimination.113

Although the extent of a communist threat at the time remains unclear, British Columbia’s legal
authorities had reason to be concerned. Their views on the matter are intelligible. Just as the full evils of
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Stalin and Mao were not fully appreciated in 1950, so too the possibility of a democratic form of
communism playing within the rules of constitutionalism had yet to be manifest.
It is possible that the benchers drew the line in the wrong place. Certainly, the result was unjust to
Gordon Martin. Hindsight, however, is perfect. Their field of vision was powerfully shaped by the
dramatic events of their time. Only if we either dismiss their fears as palpably ridiculous or subscribe to
Holmes’s radical notion of a marketplace for ideas can we rush to judgment. If we allow that the political
values of prospective lawyers might ever be properly taken into account, then things become more
complex.114
Hindsight requires a degree of humility.

Postscript
Gordon Martin “found work for a few years as a faller and in a sawmill in Nanaimo before
starting a television repair shop from home, Active TV service”. An RCMP report in 1963 stated that he
was a “good family man” with a successful business. Martin died of cancer in Nanaimo in 1974. Nearly
a quarter century later and fifty years after his exclusion from the legal profession, the Law Society of
British Columbia issued a formal apology. In 1998, its’ Treasurer (i.e. President), Trudi Brown,
explained to the Victoria Times-Colonist that “‘It’s a sorry tale,’… But it could not happen now because
‘we are only concerned if a person is competent.’ A person could be a Communist or a Nazi and become
a lawyer ‘so long as they have not broken the law.’” 115
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